Based on the non-structural model -disequilibrium approach (Goddard and Wilson, 2009) , this paper presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Vietnamese banking system from 1999 to 2009. We examine a greater number of environmental covariates and different dependent variables compared to previous applications of this model. Moreover, we use lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and exclude assets (to avoid specification bias) in our models. The results indicate that the Vietnamese banking system operates in a monopolistic environment.
Introduction
In the last two decades there has been extensive research on banking reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) -see Fries and Taci (2005) ; Bonin et al. (2005) and Staikouras et al. (2008) . The common theme of these studies was to examine bank efficiency and the role of bank ownership. Only a few studies analysed the market structure in which commercial banks operate (Nathan and Neave, 1989 and DeBandt and Davis, 2000) . Particular emphasis was given to the privatisation and the role of foreign banks in the newly established banking system. However, there is limited research on the banking system in less developed economies. In particular, there are only a few studies on the Vietnamese banking system that provide a deep analysis and policy implications for the specific transformation process adopted by the Vietnamese government in the early 1990s. The specific approach applied by the Vietnamese authorities gives us an opportunity to compare the differences between the transition process in CEE and Vietnam. Such knowledge deepens our understanding of the optimal strategies that should be adopted by the authorities in other less developed economies.
Our study contributes to the research on competitiveness of the banking sector in emerging and developing economies (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004) . We endeavour to provide a broader picture about bank competition in Vietnam. The main novelty of our study is the application of the non-structural model -disequilibrium approach introduced by Goddard and Wilson (2009) . We estimate H-statistics using models that exclude assets (to avoid specification bias) and include lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity). We examine the 'system' and 'difference' generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators with both 'one-step' and 'two-step' specifications based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . The inclusion of time period dummy variables for all periods in addition to economic covariates affects the precision of coefficient estimates for some specifications. Hence, a general-to-specific method (GSM) will be applied to remove redundant time period dummy variables in each model in an attempt to improve the efficiency of estimation and obtain meaningful H-statistics. We also assess whether the H-statistics obtained from the dynamic specification motivated by the disequilibrium approach are valid for inference. Furthermore, we employ a unique database of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks from 1999 to 2009. Such a database enables us to assess the impact of the main structural changes of the last decade and the results of this analysis provide a better understanding of the main differences of the Vietnamese banking system from other (transition) economies. 3 The paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the Vietnamese banking system while Section 3 explores a brief review of the previous empirical literature of the nonstructural model. Section 4 focuses on methodology and data. Empirical results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 gives conclusions.
The Vietnamese banking system
The first stage of the banking reform in Vietnam was similar to those in other transition economies, that is, mono-banking was dismantled and replaced by a two-tier banking system in 1986. It is important to note that the reform in Vietnam was launched earlier than the reform in some CEE countries. However, Vietnamese banks operate in a different economic environment. In particular, the geographical location has been a limiting factor in the speed of its development. Although the Asian financial crisis in 1997 did not have such dramatic negative externalities as in other countries in southeast Asia it still reduced economic growth in Vietnam. The capital inflow was much lower compared with CEE countries in the 1990s. The capital account was fully controlled which discouraged foreign investors to invest in Vietnam in terms of FDI and portfolio investment. Furthermore, a number of Asia-Pacific countries liberalised their domestic financial sectors in the 1980s, making apparent the large interest differential between domestic and world interest rates; this provided an incentive to evade capital controls. In Vietnam, nevertheless, domestic interest rate ceilings supported stringent controls over foreign borrowings, enabling the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to regulate flows of shortterm capital more efficiently (Leung and Le, 1998, p.125) . Another explanation for the minor effect of the Asian financial crisis on the country was that the weakly-developed financial market did not attract much foreign capital in the first place (Kokko, 1999, p. 84 ).
In Table 1 we present information about the development of Vietnamese commercial banks (SBV, 2009 Table 2 . In general, loans, assets, deposits and capital increased gradually over the period. Vietnamese commercial banks had a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly during the 1990s; however these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of non-state owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks (Matousek et al., 2013) .
The global financial crisis of 2008 caused a sharp economic slowdown and property boom collapse in
Vietnam and many small banks experienced serious liquidity and solvency problems during this period.
This led to interventions by the SBV. The reduced lending capacity of the banking sector is one factor that contributed to a sharp slowdown of credit growth. Tighter regulation, for example by limiting interbank lending, has also contributed to this slowdown (Maddock, 2015) .
Literature review
Empirical studies that use the non-structural model to establish the extent of contestability in banking markets are concerned with drawing inferences about market structure indirectly from observing conduct. This is because contestability, which depends on the extent of potential competition, is not observable directly (Goddard et al., 2001 ). Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple models for monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, and develop a test to discriminate between these market structures. The first market model that Panzar and Rosse investigate is monopoly. The empirical refutation of monopoly constitutes a rejection of the assumption that the 5 revenue of the banks in question is independent of the decisions made by their actual or potential rivals. The Panzar and Rosse model demonstrates that under monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenue; hence H will be zero or negative. In the case of monopolistic competition, the analysis is based on the comparative static properties of the Chamberlain equilibrium model. In equilibrium, interdependence affects the structural revenue function, and the bank's profit finally becomes zero as the conditions of entry and withdrawal are unlimited; hence the H-statistic will be smaller than 1. 3 In the case of perfect competition, under certain conditions both marginal cost and average cost increase without changing the optimum amount of the individual bank's output. If this condition occurs and some banks withdraw from the market, the remaining banks would individually face increased demand. This increased demand leads to higher prices and revenue which is equal to the increased cost and the Hstatistic is 1 (Matousek et al., 2013) . in certain areas of the banking market. With the current trends and challenges in global markets, it is apposite that current policy decisions focus on levels of competition within Jamaica's banking sector.
In Vietnam, three previous studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse model to the Vietnamese banking system. Bikker et al. (2006a Bikker et al. ( , 2006b ) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) used the ratio of annual personal expenses to total assets as an approximation for the price of personal expenses, and the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price of capital expenditure. Matousek et al. (2013) examined the performance of the Vietnamese banking system between 1999 and 2009 using a non-structural model assuming an equilibrium approach. This is also the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excludes assets (to avoid bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. The H-statistics are between 0.45 and 0.43
indicating that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition. However, none of these studies applied the non-structural model to the Vietnamese banking system using the disequilibrium approach.
Methodology and data

Calculation of the H-statistic under the disequilibrium approach
We consider non-structural models based on the Panzar-Rosse specification extended to include a lagged dependent variable (according to the disequilibrium approach) of the following empirical form: (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004, p. 50 and Nathan and Neave, 2001, p. 580) .
is the capital to total assets ratio;
is the loans to deposits ratio; and LN(BR i,t ) is the natural logarithm of the number of branches.
Based upon the disequilibrium approach the H-statistic that is used to determine the degree of competition is calculated from (1) using:
From equation (2), if H ≤ 0 the market is a monopoly, if 0 < H < 1 the market is in monopolistic competition and if H = 1 the market is in perfect competition. 
Models with and without assets
Many previous empirical studies include among the controls the log of total assets, ) ( et al. (2006a) pointed out that it is incorrect to estimate a revenue elasticity using a specification that includes a quantity-type variable among the controls, or using a specification which, through rescaling, then it is immaterial whether the dependent variable is unscaled (not divided by total assets) or scaled (divided by total assets). In either case the coefficients on the factor input prices ( 
Models with current and lagged input prices
Simultaneity is a dual direction of causality in a system of equations which violates the assumption that the explanatory variables and equation's error term are uncorrelated. Variables in a regression can violate this assumption for several reasons, including omitted variable bias, measurement error and simultaneity/reverse causation. Models including the current values of input prices might suffer from simultaneity (endogeneity) bias between input prices and the dependent variables (revenue and interest income). One means of assessing whether or not one or more of the input prices (LN(IE/FF), LN(PE/TE) and LN(CE/FA)) suffers from endogeneity is to compare regressions using current input prices with those including lagged input prices -see Shaffer (2004) and Goddard and Wilson (2009) .
Large differences in the estimated coefficients (and therefore H-statistics) using models with current input prices and using models with lagged input prices is taken as an indication of the endogeneity of input prices. Results summarised in Table 7 generally indicate large differences in the coefficients on current and lagged input prices and therefore H-statistics. We, therefore, focus on the models employing lagged input prices in Tables 3 -6 in order to ensure valid inference.
Estimation
Econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (1) using panel data. These include the process being dynamic, with current realisations of the dependent variable being influenced by its past values, and that the idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of 9 heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. To address these issues a GMM estimator, such as that introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and those discussed by Roodman (2009) , may be used. The difference and system GMM estimators can be applied using either the one-step method (with robust coefficient standard errors) or the two-step method (with Windmeijer, 2005 , small sample corrected coefficient standard errors). 7 We consider both the one-step GMM estimator (with robust coefficient standard errors) and the twostep GMM estimator. A downward bias afflicts the standard errors calculated by the two-step method, however, using Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors with two-step GMM greatly reduces this problem with biased coefficient standard errors.
8 A feasible approximation of Windmeijer's small sample correction for two-step GMM's coefficient standard errors has been shown to perform well in simulations (Roodman, 2009 ).
The following properties of standard estimators applied to a dynamic model (incorporating a lagged dependent variable) that should include cross-sectional fixed-effects will guide the evaluation of our estimated models. The (pooled) OLS estimator (without fixed-effects) will suffer from dynamic panel bias and will be inconsistent for small T (the number of time periods) in the sense that increasing N (the number of cross-sectional units) will not make the estimator consistent. 9 The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable will be biased upwards if pooled OLS is applied to a dynamic model without accounting for fixed-effects in finite samples. The fixed-effects estimator will also suffer from dynamic panel bias and inconsistency (as N tends to infinity) when T is small. 10 In contrast to pooled OLS, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable will be biased downwards if the fixed-effects estimator is applied to a dynamic model in finite samples. Interestingly the bias of the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators work in opposite directions. We estimate our models with both estimators and use the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to provide a range within which one would normally expect the true coefficient to fall.
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In the application of GMM, Sargan (Roodman, 2009) . We report the number of instruments and ensure that this number does not exceed the number of cross-sectional units (banks).
In our application, we consider both difference and system GMM estimators using both the one-step (with robust standard errors) and two-step (with Windmeijer correction) procedures. By using robust standard errors we do not assume spherical disturbances and so the Hansen test is our favoured method for assessing the validity of instruments. The criteria that we require for a model to be valid are:
 The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable estimated by GMM (denoted L1 in the tables) must fall in the range of the lagged dependent variable's coefficient estimated by Ordinary least squares (L1 OLS) and by the fixed-effects estimator (L1 FE).
 There is no second-order autocorrelation, denoted AR(2), or evidence of invalid instruments, denoted Hansen (these tests' probability values should be higher than 0.05).
 The number of instruments is smaller than the number of cross-sectional units. In all of our reported models, this criterion is satisfied.
 The H-statistics should be sufficiently well determined, in the sense that they are not insignificantly different from both zero and one, to be usefully informative on the hypothesis of interest.
If more than one model satisfies these criteria we choose our favoured specification for inference as follows:
 If the test of the null hypothesis that there are no period fixed-effects (H 0 period FE) is rejected at the 5% level we favour the model including period dummy variables. Otherwise, we prefer the one without period dummies.
 We prefer the model with the smallest coefficient standard error on the lagged dependent variable as recommended by Roodman (2009) .
We note that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significant in all of our reported models which justifies our application of GMM using a dynamic specification.
Data
In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the SBV, National Library of Vietnam and individual banks. Although the number of banks for which there is data is only half of the total in the Vietnamese banking system they account for more than 90% of total customer loans, total customer deposits and total assets. The models estimated using 'LN(REV)' as the dependent variable are reported in columns 2 to 5 of Table 3 . The Hansen tests of the 'difference' estimators (both being 0.048) show that the instruments are invalid. Furthermore, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of the model using the twostep system estimator (0.6926) lies outside the range of this variable's coefficient estimated by OLS (0.8256) and FE (0.7168). Thus, this model is also considered invalid. However, the model estimated 14 We also summarise the full sample (1999-2009) results in Table 7 as follows: (1) with assets and current input prices; (2) with assets and lagged input prices and (3) without assets and with current input prices. Further, the results of the models estimated over the subsamples (1999-2003; 2004-2009 ; five state owned commercial banks and 43 non-state owned commercial banks) using current and lagged input prices both with and without assets are also presented in Table 7 .
15 For all models reported in Table 3 (Tables 4 -6 ) the two (one) dummies (dummy) D1999 and D2009 (D1999) are (is) automatically dropped by the Stata software due to collinearity. 16 The Hansen test has a null hypothesis of "the instruments as a group are exogenous". The Arellano -Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR(2) in first differences is important because it will detect autocorrelation in levels. These models are regarded as valid when these tests' p-values are higher than 0.05. 17 To estimate t-statistics that test whether the H-statistics are statistically different from to zero or one, we need to calculate the coefficients in static long-run equilibrium and their standard errors. The standard error for this t-test is calculated using the formula given in De Boef and Keele (2008).
13 using the one-step system estimator is valid according to all of our criteria. Hence, we use the model based on the one-step system estimator for inference. The H-statistic (being -1.28) is significantly different from one if not significantly different from zero (and is therefore regarded as well determined). This suggests that the Vietnamese banking system was in monopoly between 1999 and 2009 when LN(REV) is the dependent variable.
As for the other variables' coefficients in this favoured model using LN(REV), the logarithmic interest expense per total funds (LN(IE/FF)) has a negative and significant coefficient while personal expense per person (LN(PE/TE) and capital expense per fixed asset (LN(CE/FA)) have insignificant coefficients.
The number of branches (LN(BR)) has a positive and significant coefficient while all other variables are insignificant.
The models using LN(INT) as the dependent variable are reported in columns 6 to 9 of Table 3 . The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable based on the one-step difference estimator is 0.8525 which is outside of the range of the corresponding variable's coefficient estimated by OLS (0.8420) and FE (0.7642). However, the models using the 'system' and two-step difference estimators are valid for inference according to all of our criteria except that their H-statistics (ranging from -3.86 to -2.86) are not significantly different from both zero and one. Hence, these H-statistics are poorly determined and are arguably uninformative. We therefore use a general-to-specific (GSM) type procedure to eliminate redundant time period dummy variables in all of the models to find valid specifications with well determined H-statistics. Our procedure is loosely based upon the GSM in that we consider the models by sequentially deleting dummies based upon their degree of statistical insignificance.
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimated revenue equations and associated H-statistics when LN(INT) is the dependent variable after employing the GSM-type procedure to eliminate insignificant time dummy
variables. The results of the models based on the one-step system estimator are presented in Table 4 .
We eliminate time dummy variables with t-ratios below one in absolute value (D2006 and D2009) and report the resulting models in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2006) and 4 (excluding D2006 and D2009). 18 These models are valid according to all of the criteria we employ except that the H-statistics are not significantly different from both zero and one and so these results remain uninformative for inference.
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The specifications using the two-step difference estimator with LN(INT) as the dependent variable is reported in Table 5 . We exclude time dummy variables with t-statistics below 0.8 in magnitude (being D2007 and D2009) and report the results in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2007) and 4
(excluding D2007 and D2009). These models are valid according to all of our criteria except for the Hstatistics being insignificantly different from both zero and one in all three cases and so these results are considered imprecisely estimated and uninformative.
In the specification using the two-step system estimator we exclude time dummy variables with tratios less than one in absolute value, being D2006 and D2009, and report the models in columns 5
(excluding D2009), 6 (excluding D2006) and 7 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 5 . These three models are valid according to all of our criteria except the models reported in column 5 and 6 feature uninformative and imprecisely estimated H-statistics that are insignificantly different from both zero and one. However, the H-statistic of the model that excludes both D2006 and D2009, reported in column 7, is precisely estimated in the sense that it is not insignificantly different from both zero and one. Overall, we favour this model for inference when LN(INT) is the dependent variable because it is the only valid model that is sufficiently precisely estimated to be informative. The H-statistic (being - For comparison purposes and consistency we also apply the GSM-type procedure to specifications where LN(REV) is the dependent variable. Table 6 reports these models based on the one-step system estimator. 20 We exclude time dummy variables with t-ratios less than one in magnitude (being D2006 and D2009) and present the resulting models in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2006) and 4 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 6 . These models are valid according to all of our criteria. The H-statistics of these three models are not significantly different from zero, although they are all significantly different from one (so are precisely estimated). We prefer the model reported in column 4 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 6 because it has the lowest standard error for the dependent variable of all the models (being 0.075). The H-statistic is -1.36 which is not significantly different from zero if it is significantly different from one. This confirms the inference drawn from the results reported in Table 3 Table 7 presents a summary of further results obtained from the non-structural model using the disequilibrium approach (full results are available from the authors on request). 21 The results are for models using, alternatively, current and lagged input prices both with and without assets included.
Results are summarised for the full sample, the following sub-samples through time: 1999-2003 and 2004-2009 ; and the following sub-samples by bank type: the five state owned commercial banks and the 43 non-state owned commercial banks.
We apply the GSM-type procedure to the time period dummy variables in each model in an attempt to secure valid specifications and H-statistics. We report the favoured model in each case as that with the 20 No specifications that are valid for inference with LN(REV) as the regressand that use the 'two-step' estimators and one-step difference estimator excluding time dummy variables (following the GSM-type procedure) could be found. In particular, all of the coefficients on the first lagged dependent variables (0.6926, 0.722, 0.9245, 0.8406 and 0.9236) , available from the authors on request, fall outside of the ranges of the corresponding variable's coefficients estimated by OLS and FE and so all of these models are regarded as invalid. 21 We also experiment to find valid specifications (and H-statistics) by excluding insignificant control variables (TC/TA, CL/CD and LN(BR)); treating input prices (LN(PE/TE), LN(IE/FF) and LN(CE/FA)) as endogenous variables and lastly excluding insignificant input prices. However, these experiment did not improve the results.
smallest coefficient standard error on the dependent variable in models that are valid for inference (according to the criteria discussed above) and well determined (in the sense that H-statistics are not insignificantly different from both zero and one). The models using current input prices and including assets suggest for the full sample and sub-samples that the Vietnamese banking system is in monopolistic competition. The removal of total assets from these models transforms our inference to suggest that the market is not significantly different from perfect competition except for the subsample for state owned commercial banks, which suggests monopolistic competition (if it is not significantly different from being monopolistic). In the models using lagged input prices and including assets for the full sample with LN(REV/TA) as the dependent variable and for most samples when LN(INT/TA) was the regressand valid specifications and H-statistics could not be found. In the subsamples where valid results are available (these are the only ones reported) they generally suggest that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition (if it is close to monopoly).
When assets are excluded from the models, our inference indicates monopoly for all samples. The substantial difference in the estimated coefficients (as reflected in the H-statistics) between the models with current and lagged input prices suggests endogeneity of current input prices. Hence we prefer the models using lagged input prices for inference. Further, the substantial difference in inference obtained from the models that include assets and those that exclude assets confirms the need to appropriately specify the revenue equations to exclude assets. Hence, in our analysis of subsamples we favour the results that include lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and exclude assets (to avoid bias), reported in the last two columns of Table 7 . The results for all of these (sub) samples confirms that the Vietnamese banking system operated under monopoly and that there is no significant change through time or in comparing state owned and non-state owned banks. Matousek et al. (2013) used the fixed-effects estimator that does not allow for dynamics in the model (the equilibrium approach) and reported H-statistics (being 0.45 and 0.43) for the full sample period 1999 -2009 that indicate monopolistic competition. This contrasts with our H-statistics that suggest a highly monopolistic market (-1.36 and -2.61) based upon the disequilibrium approach that does allow for dynamic effects. 22 As we mentioned earlier, the GMM estimator is preferred for inference if the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significantly different from zero otherwise the fixed- 22 The H-statistics are generally higher for models where revenue is the dependent variable in our favoured models. The H-statistics for the full sample of data is -1.36 for the model when LN(REV) is the dependent variable and -2.61 when LN(INT) is the regressand. Therefore the market is more competitive when based on revenue. This is consistent with the results from the equilibrium approach (Matousek et al., 2013 ) and our expectation.
effects estimator (used in the equilibrium approach) should be used for inference (Roodman, 2009 ).
The disequilibrium approach is preferred for inference in the Vietnamese banking system as the tratios on the lagged dependent variables are statistically significant in our favoured models. Hence, Spierdijk and Shaffer (2015) who derived these for the case when H > 0 (whereas our results suggest ≤ 0).
Conclusion
We are the first to employ the non-structural model -disequilibrium approach (Goddard and Wilson, 2009 ) to examine the Vietnamese banking system. This study also extends the previous literature by considering environmental factors such as capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches which have not been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. Further, we employ the two different dependent variables: revenue divided by total assets (REV/TA) and interest income divided by total assets (INT/TA). This is also the first study that properly specifies the revenue equation by excluding assets (to avoid bias) and including lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system's competitiveness. In addition, we consider the 'system' and 'difference'
GMM estimators with both 'one-step' and 'two-step' specifications based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Whilst the inclusion of time period dummy variables is supported by the data their presence for all periods, in addition to economic covariates, can undermine the precision of 18 coefficient estimates. Hence, in the spirit of the general-to-specific method we remove the most redundant time period dummy variables in an attempt to improve the efficiency of estimation and obtain well determined H-statistics. Results are analysed for the full sample and sub-samples of the data. In particular, we split the sample according to the type of bank (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) and through time (1999-2003 and 2004-2009) . Our results use a larger sample both in terms of the number of banks and number of time periods compared to any previous analysis of the Vietnamese banking system.
Our empirical results show that the disequilibrium approach is more appropriate than the equilibrium approach for inference due to the significance of the lagged dependent variable in our models. The H- A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. Given our finding that the Vietnamese banking system is monopolistic the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) should have policies for restructuring the system and promoting competition in the banking sector of Vietnam. This also aligns with recent policies from the SBV to promote mergers and acquisitions, increasing the financial autonomy of banks. 23 The SBV targeted 6 to 7 mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector in 2014, and a 50% reduction in the number of commercial banks in the period of -2017 (WB, 2014 . As large and very large banks are more efficient than small and medium-sized banks (Stewart et al., 2016) Our results also indicate that banks that open more branches enjoy increased revenue and interest income except for state owned commercial banks. Hence, the SBV should have policies to enhance the development of non-state owned commercial banks (also see Stewart et al., 2016) . The recent restructuring plan allows the SBV to intervene in weak credit institutions, leading to the quick and thorough handling of these credit institutions. The SBV also focuses on non-performing loans of state owned commercial banks with various measures, including deciding the real estate market, solving inventories for enterprises and promoting the restructuring of state enterprises (SBV, 2014) .
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The results suggest that banks are less monopolistic when revenue is used as the dependent variable than when interest income is. Sources of revenue might be securities, credit cards, derivative products, etc while sources of interest income are almost entirely from customer loans. With lending limited, banks have used a variety or principles to allocate credit. Some have been allocated through personal relationships, some through political connections, and some by price-gauging (Maddock, 2015) . We believe that this suggests that the SBV should introduce more regulations and policies to enhance competition in terms of customer loans.
We argue that the tightening monetary policies that started in 2008 still have a large impact on the banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and deposits. Macroeconomic policies from the SBV should be used simultaneously and reasonably to meet the high demand of loans from the public and to control increased inflation due to a rapid increase in credit growth. The transition Vietnam is undertaking is complex. The role of the state is changing and so is the use of markets in the evolution of the society. Some combination of pushing ahead with underlying reforms while allowing growth to resolve some of the issues may be the appropriate path (Maddock, 2015) . 
